Title: Quantum Key Distribution – Transitioning to Future Cryptography
Speaker: Andrei Andries (masterand SAL, UB)
Abstract: The talk discusses Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which marks the transition from mathematics-based to physics-based cryptography. While QKD is in continuous development, there are still unsolved issues (such as long-distance transmission and hardware limitations).
Abstract: Zero-knowledge SNARKs (zkSNARKs) are cryptographic proof systems that allow a prover to convince a verifier that a statement is true, with very small proofs and fast verification, without revealing the underlying witness. The standard security notion for SNARKs is knowledge soundness, which guarantees that any prover who convinces the verifier must “know” a valid witness. A stronger notion is simulation extractability, which ensures that even an adversary who has seen simulated proofs cannot create a new valid proof without actually knowing a witness, and in particular implies non-malleability. This stronger guarantee is especially important in distributed and adversarial settings, where proof malleability can become a real threat. In this talk, we revisit simulation extractability for universal zkSNARKs in the PIOP-to-SNARK paradigm. We discuss how this property can be achieved and analyzed in systems used in practice, with particular attention to optimizations such as the linearization trick. We also place these results in a broader context, reviewing existing approaches to simulation extractability in the literature and highlighting alternative techniques and trade-offs. The goal is to give a unified and accessible picture of how simulation extractability can be obtained in modern zkSNARK constructions, and what design choices are needed to ensure it in practice.
PATTERN receives funding from the French National Research Agency under Grant Agreement No. ANR-23-CHR4-0008, the Luxembourg National Fund under Grant Agreement No. INTER/CHIST23/17931746, and the Romanian Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization, CNCS/CCCDI – UEFISCDI, project number ERANET-CHISTERA-IV-PATTERN, within PNCDI IV.
Abstract:A subgroup H of G = F2 x …. x F2 is implicitly given by a function rho on G. The function rho is constant on classes H+x. A classical quantum algorithm is able to find a generating set of H.
Acknowledgement: This seminar talk is (in part) due to Q-FENCE, Programme HORIZON.2.3 – Civil Security for Society, grant agreement ID: 101225708.
This project has received funding from the European Unions Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101225708 as well as the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).
Acknowledgement: This seminar talk is (in part) due to Q-FENCE, Programme HORIZON.2.3 – Civil Security for Society, grant agreement ID: 101225708.
This project has received funding from the European Unions Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101225708 as well as the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).
Title: Cybersecurity of Industrial Control Systems
Speaker: Stéphane Mocanu (INRIA)
Abstract: In this talk, we discuss the state of the art of industrial control systems cybersecurity. Based on classical events, we analyse the typical threats and the vulnerabilities that they exploit. In the second part of the talk, we present the security architectures and security practices as recommended by international standards (ISO 27000, IEC 62443) and NIST Cybersecurity Framework).
Acknowledgement: This seminar talk is (in part) due to Q-FENCE, Programme HORIZON.2.3 – Civil Security for Society, grant agreement ID: 101225708.
This project has received funding from the European Unions Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101225708 as well as the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).
Abstract: Basing QC notions are presented: superposition, wave-function and probability, qubit, independence, entanglement.
Acknowledgement: This seminar talk is (in part) due to Q-FENCE, Programme HORIZON.2.3 – Civil Security for Society, grant agreement ID: 101225708.
This project has received funding from the European Unions Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101225708 as well as the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI).
On November 27th 2025, the cybersecurity team of the Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science of the University of Bucharest, dothidden, had the honor of participating in the 10th edition of the USV-CTF competition that was held online for 24 hours.
The team formed by our Bachelor in Computer Science students Scânteie Alexandru-Ioan (Year 2), Granat Andrei-Ionuț (Year 1), Dodu Andrei-Daniel (Year 1) and Andreiana Bogdan Mihail (Year 2) obtained the 1st place out of 67 in the competition consisting of teams from 15 national and international universities.
The exercise proposed at the USV-CTF consisted of a pentesting task on a virtual machine provided by the organizers, a task in which the team exploited web vulnerabilities such as OWASP top 10 (SQL Injection, Server-side template injection (SSTI), JWT crafting, etc.), performed reverse engeineering on an Android Application and, ultimately, performed privillage escalation to gain root. The technical report can be found at https://dothidden.xyz/ctfs/ctf-usv_2025/squidgame/.